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1 Introduction
That individuals' preferences might be incomplete is an old idea (Von Neumann and Mor-
genstern, 1944; Aumann, 1962). Indeed, there are many important decisions in our life
that we ﬁnd diﬃcult to make, e.g., which job to accept, which house to buy, which girl
or boy to marry. Incomplete preferences arise when there are conﬂicting motives or be-
liefs toward alternatives (Ok et al., 2012), and individuals are indecisive when they have
incomplete preferences. Much advance has been made on incomplete preferences. Among
others, see e.g., Dubra et al. (2004); Ok et al. (2012); Galaabaatar and Karni (2013) for
recent developments.
Despite the diﬃculty in making decisions, most of us do choose a career, buy a house,
and marry someone. What would people with incomplete preferences do when they are
forced to make a decision? Can we measure indecisiveness? What are the behavioral
consequences in the process of completing incomplete preferences? In this paper we go
beyond incomplete preferences per se and provide an answer to the above questions. We
propose a model for individuals who have incomplete preferences and attempt to complete
them. Based on the model, we develop an incentive-compatible mechanism to measure
indecisiveness in preferences. Finally, we implement a ﬁrst experimental test of the model.
Concretely, we focus on incomplete preferences resulting from conﬂicting objectives by
assuming that individuals have not a single but a set of utility functions. This idea is
consistent with the characterization of incomplete preferences in, e.g., Dubra et al. (2004).
Given any speciﬁc utility function in this set, individuals have complete preferences and
perform standard expected utility calculations. Individuals' ultimate decision utility is
obtained by aggregating across diﬀerent utility functions. The aggregation process is done
by taking a subjective expectation of the concavely transformed standard expected utilities
with respect to the set of utility functions.
Based on the model, we develop an incentive-compatible mechanism to measure indeci-
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siveness in preferences. In the mechanism we propose individuals face a series of tasks.
In each of these tasks, individuals face two alternatives: an alternative x over which we
are interested in knowing indecisiveness in preferences, and a sure payment y, over which
individuals are assumed to have complete preferences. Instead of choosing one option out
of the two, as in typical pairwise choice tasks, individuals are allowed to choose a λ ∈ [0, 1]
and build a simple lottery (λx, (1 − λ)y). When individuals' preferences are incomplete
and their behavior is in line with our model, we show that (1) there exists a unique optimal
λ∗ that maximizes the individual's decision utility; (2) the value of the optimal λ∗ can be
used to calculate indecisiveness in preferences over alternative x. In particular, the value
of λ∗ can be interpreted as the choice probability in the stochastic choice models (e.g.,
Machina, 1985; Harless and Camerer, 1994) and has a striking similarity to the matching
law in operant conditioning (Herrnstein, 1961; McDowell, 2005).1
Finally, we ran an experiment to test our model. Option x was a payment of 20 euro in
one month's time, while Option y consisted of an immediate payment ranging from 11
euro to 20 euro with an increment of 1 euro. Our experimental results suggest that a
vast majority of subjects randomizes over Option x and Option y for at least two values
of Option y, and the randomization probability of choosing Option x decreases with the
value of Option y. We show that the deliberate randomization pattern in our experimental
results is consistent with our model, but stands in sharp contrast with most models that
assume complete preferences, e.g., the expected utility theory and cumulative prospect
theory.
Among others Dwenger et al. (2014), Cettolin and Riedl (2015), and Agranov and Ortol-
eva (2017) experimentally examined individuals' preferences for deliberate randomization.
Compared to their methods, our setting has three advantages. First, we need only one
choice to reveal preferences for deliberate randomization, whereas Agranov and Ortoleva
(2017) need a number of repeated choices to do so. Second, our randomization emerges
endogenously and randomization probability varies with choice pairs, whereas in Dwenger
et al. (2014) and Cettolin and Riedl (2015) the randomization is exogenously ﬁxed by a
1The matching law in operant conditioning states that the probability of an alternative being chosen is
based on the relative attractiveness of options.
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random device. Third, our measure is continuous, and, with three choices, we can measure
the degree of indecisiveness.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a model of valuation under incomplete
preferences, and, based on the model, it provides an incentive-compatible measure of in-
decisiveness in preferences. Section 3 provides supporting evidence of our model from an
experiment. Section 4 concludes.
2 Completing incomplete preferences: a model and a mea-
surement
2.1 A model
There is a close parallel between our model and ambiguity models of multiple priors.
Indeed, in ambiguity models of multiple priors, an individual faces an ambiguous scenario
and she has a number of probability measures, i.e., multiple priors. In our model, an
individual is uncertain which utility functions she should use to evaluate an alternative.
Note, however, that the two lines of models are conceptually diﬀerent. In models of multiple
priors, the individual has a unique utility function, and the focus is on the aggregation
across diﬀerent probability measures. In the current model, the individual faces a simple
lottery, and the diﬃculty arises in the aggregation across diﬀerent utility functions. In
the development of assumptions and obtaining the representation theorem, we borrow the
modeling technique of multiple priors models, the smooth ambiguity model of Klibanoﬀ
et al. (2005) in particular, and apply it to incomplete preferences.
Concretely, let C be a compact metric space, and c ∈ C be a non-monetary outcome.
Note that C includes the empty outcome ♦. Let X = C × [w, b] be the set of outcomes
and x an element of X, where [w, b] is the set of monetary outcomes that is large enough
and 0 ∈ [w, b]. The set of outcomes X that we consider is quite general. It includes all
possible aspects of a decision that aﬀect the decision maker's well-being. Thus, besides
monetary outcomes, the outcome space also includes, for example, a one-week trip to Paris,
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an increased safety of a car, or an improvement in air quality. A risky lottery l ∈ L is
then a Borel probability measure over X, where L ≡ 4X. The model is mainly interested
in , an individual's preference over L. In a standard expected utility framework, the
individual's preference is captured by a single utility function, u : X → R, such that
for any risky lotteries l1 and l2 ∈ L, l1  l2 ⇐⇒
∫
X u (x) dl1 ≥
∫
X u (x) dl2. When 
is potentially incomplete, diﬃculties arise, and it is unclear what decision an individual
makes. Let τ ∈ Γ be one potential self, τ denote an individual's preference given a self,
and Γ is a metric space that denotes the set of selfs. Thus, the set of selfs is deﬁned as the
state space in the sense of Anscombe and Aumann (1963), with each self corresponding to
a potential state. Let Π denote the set of Borel probability measures over Γ. Our main
result is summarized in the representation theorem below. A more detailed development
of the representation theorem can be found in Appendix 1.
Theorem 1. There exists a countably additive probability measure pi ∈ Π and a continuous
and strictly increasing φ : R → R subjecting to positive aﬃne transformation such that 
is represented by the preference functional V : L→ R given by
V (l) =
∫
Γ
φ [EUτ (l)] dpi. (1)
In Equation 1 pi measures indecisiveness in preferences and the curvature of φ(·) captures an
individual's attitudes toward indecisiveness. In principle, the function φ(·) can be concave,
linear, or convex. A concave φ(·) implies an aversion to indecisiveness as it punishes
the disagreement - deviations from the mean expected utility - among diﬀerent selfs. A
linear φ(·) implies a neutral attitude toward indecisiveness, and a convex φ(·) implies
indecisiveness seeking. Below we assume that individuals are averse to indecisiveness and,
hence, φ(·) is concave. Note that to arrive at a single value when one has many selfs is, in
essence, similar to situations where a group of people with diﬀerent opinions tries to reach a
consensus. The more strongly members disagree with each other, the more diﬃcult it is for
the group to make compromises and agree on a single opinion. Aversion to indecisiveness
in preferences can then be interpreted as the cost of forcing diﬀerent selfs to agree on a
single value. The assumption of aversion to indecisiveness is also consistent with Levitt
(2016) where he shows that indecisive subjects - those who having diﬃculty to make a
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decision - are often excessively cautious when facing important choices.
Our paper is related to a paper by Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2015). They start with standard
axioms - including the completeness axiom - and replace only the independence axiom
with a weaker axiom which they call Negative Certainty Independence. They character-
ize utility representations for all preferences that satisfy Negative Certainty Independence
and other basic rationality postulates. In their representation individuals behave as if they
have a set of utility functions and evaluate alternatives according to the utility function
giving the lowest certainty equivalent; other utility functions or indecisiveness in prefer-
ences play no role. They then show beautifully that the representation can be used to
complete an incomplete preference relation. Our model starts with incomplete preferences
and aims to complete them. Our set of states is the set of utility functions instead of the
set of uncertain outcomes that lie outside of the decision maker. Our model is built on a
diﬀerent set of assumptions, and the representation is characterized by smoothness. In the
completion process our individuals consider all utility functions in the set, and indecisive-
ness in preferences plays a central role. Due to the smoothness of the representation an
incentive-compatible measure of indecisiveness in preferences can be developed.
2.2 An incentive-compatible measurement of indecisiveness in prefer-
ences
As the discussion in the introduction highlights, there have been a number of papers
on the existence and importance of incomplete preferences. A natural question to ask,
then, given an alternative, is how we measure indecisiveness in preferences. According
to Equation 1, an individual's indecisiveness in preferences is captured by the subjective
distribution pi over uτ . Consistent with the literature in decision making under risk, a
natural candidate for the measurement of indecisiveness in preferences is the standard
deviation of the subjective distribution pi over uτ (σ
2
pi). Hence, if we could somehow
measure σ2pi, we would obtain a proxy for indecisiveness in preferences. Below we propose
such a measurement mechanism. As it will be seen shortly, it is incentive-compatible and
easy to implement.
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More speciﬁcally, the mechanism works as follows. An individual faces two options. Denote
these two options by x and y. Option y is a yardstick, and we are interested in measuring
the individual's indecisiveness in preferences over Option x. In most preceding studies, an
individual would be asked to choose between two options, Option x or Option y (see e.g.,
Holt, 1986). In the so-called outcome matching method, an individual is asked to compare
option x with a list of increasing sure payoﬀs y.2 However, straightforward choices yield
only limited dichotomous information. In particular, there is no room for individuals to
express their indecisiveness in preferences.
In the current mechanism, we proceed diﬀerently: we ask the individual, instead of choosing
one option out of the two, to choose a λ ∈ [0, 1] and build a simple lottery: (λx, (1− λ)y).
The meaning of the lottery (λx, (1−λ)y) is easier to understand for decisions with a ﬁnite
set of outcomes. Let x be (x1, p1; ...;xn, pn) and y be (y1, q1; ...; yn, qn), then (λx, (1 −
λ)y)=(x1, λp1; ...;xn, λpn; y, (1− λ)q1; ...; yn, (1− λ)qn). Below we show that, when the
individual behaves according to our model, there exist some values of y inducing the
individual to strictly prefer the lottery (λx, (1− λ)y), with 0 < λ < 1, over Option x and
Option y.
For any particular self τ , the individual's preference over the lottery (λx, (1−λ)y) satisﬁes
the expected utility theory.3 Explicitly, given a self τ , we have EUτ [λx+ (1− λ)y] =
λEUτ (x) + (1 − λ)EUτ (y). The individual's decision is then to maximize her utility by
choosing 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 properly:
Maxλ V [λx+ (1− λ)y] =
∫
Γ
φ [λEUτ (x) + (1− λ)EUτ (y)] dpi.
Taking ﬁrst order derivative of the above equation gives4
2In discussion below Option y is often an alternative oﬀering a sure amount of payment y. When no
confusion is possible we abuse the use of notations slightly and identify y with Option y.
3See Assumption 1 in Appendix.
4The second-order derivative is
d2V [λx+ (1− λy)]
dλ2
=
∫
Γ
φ′′ [λEUτ (x) + (1− λ)EUτ (y)]× [EUτ (x)− EUτ (y)]2 dpi.
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dV [λx+ (1− λ)y]
dλ
=
∫
Γ
φ′ [λEUτ (x) + (1− λ)EUτ (y)]× [EUτ (x)− EUτ (y)] dpi = 0.
In some cases, preferences of x over y can be straightforward, e.g., when options can be
ordered by some dominance rules. For example, when options x and y are risky lotteries and
option x ﬁrst degree stochastically dominates option y, it seems natural that individuals
have EUτ (x) > EUτ (y), for ∀τ ∈ Γ. Since φ′ [λEUτ (x) + (1− λ)EUτ (y)] > 0, this leads
to a positive ﬁrst order condition and, hence, λ = 1. Unfortunately, two options cannot in
general be ordered via simple dominance rules. In such situations the choice of λ would
give insights on indecisiveness in preferences over option x.
Note that EUτ (x) and EUτ (y) are random variables governed by the probability distribu-
tion pi. Let X = EUτ (x) and Y = EUτ (y), and ∆τ = X − Y . With these notations, we
have
φ′ [λEUτ (x) + (1− λ)EUτ (y)] = φ′ [Y + λ∆τ ] .
We are mostly interested in the scenario where the individual ﬁnds choosing out of Option
x and Option y diﬃcult, i.e., when the two options are close. Speciﬁcally, we are interested
in those situations where ∆τ is small relative to X and Y. When this is the case, we can
use the Taylor expansion and obtain
φ′ [Y + λ∆τ ] = φ′(Y ) + φ′′(Y )λ∆τ +O (λ∆τ ) ≈ φ′(Y ) + φ′′(Y )λ∆τ ,
where O (λ∆τ ) is the sum of the terms that have λ∆τ with a power of two or higher. The
above ﬁrst order condition can then be written as
Since φ(·) is concave, φ′′(·) is negative. We are interested in situations where options x and y are not
the same, i.e., EUτ (x) 6= EUτ (y) for some τ ∈ Γ . Together we have φ′′ [λEUτ (x) + (1− λ)EUτ (y)] ×
[EUτ (x)− EUτ (y)]2 ≤ 0, and the inequality is strict for some τ ∈ Γ . Consequently, d
2V [λx+(1−λy)]
dλ2
=∫
Γ
φ′′ [λEUτ (x) + (1− λ)EUτ (y)] × [EUτ (x)− EUτ (y)]2 dpi < 0. This ensures we are indeed seeking for
the maximum.
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dV [λx+(1−λ)y]
dλ =
∫
Γ φ
′ [Y + λ∆τ ] ∆τdpi,
≈ ∫Γ [φ′(Y ) + φ′′(Y )λ∆τ ] ∆τdpi
= Eτ [φ
′(Y )∆τ ] + λEτ
[
φ′′(Y )∆2τ
]
= 0,
where Eτ (·) is the expectation operator with respect to the distribution pi . Solving for λ,
and we have
λ∗ =

0
− Eτ [φ′(Y )∆τ ]
Eτ [φ′′(Y )∆2τ ]
1
− Eτ [φ′(Y )∆τ ]
Eτ [φ′′(Y )∆2τ ]
≤ 0,
0<- Eτ [φ
′(Y )∆τ ]
Eτ [φ′′(Y )∆2τ ]
< 1,
− Eτ [φ′(Y )∆τ ]
Eτ [φ′′(Y )∆2τ ]
≥ 1.
It seems reasonable to assume that the individual's preference over a sure payment today
is complete. Such an assumption is similar to but weaker than the requirement that
preferences are complete over constant acts (see e.g., Ok et al., 2012). Speciﬁcally, when
option y is a sure payment, Y would be a constant. It follows then that Eτ [φ
′(Y )∆τ ] =
φ′(Y )Eτ [∆τ ], and Eτ [φ′′(Y )∆2τ ] = φ′′(Y )Eτ [∆2τ ]. Similar to decision making under risk, let
−φ′′(Y )φ′(Y ) denote a metric of attitudes toward indecisiveness in preferences, and the optimal
value of λ becomes:
λ∗ =

0
1
−φ′′(Y )
φ′(Y )
× Eτ [∆τ ]
Eτ [∆2τ ]
1
λ∗ ≤ 0,
0<λ∗ < 1,
λ∗ ≥ 1.
(2)
Recall ∆τ = X − Y . We then have Eτ
[
∆2τ
]
= Eτ
[
(X − Y )2] = σ2x + [Eτ (X)− Y ]2 and
Eτ [∆τ ] = Eτ (X)−Y . Thus, when 0<λ∗ < 1, the optimal value of λ∗ decreases with inde-
cisiveness in preferences over option x and the individual's attitudes toward indecisiveness
in preferences. When σ2x > [Eτ (X)− Y ]2, i.e., indecisiveness in preferences is suﬃciently
large, λ∗ increases with ∆τ .
Equation 2 can be used to estimate δ2x. Y is the utility over sure outcomes and is relatively
easy to estimate. The metric for indecisiveness attitudes −φ′′(Y )φ′(Y ) should not change sub-
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stantially with small variation of Y . With Y at hand, only three variables in Equation 2
remain unknown: a measure of indecisiveness in preferences that we want to estimate σ2x,
the metric for indecisiveness attitudes −φ′′(Y )φ′(Y ) , and Eτ (X). Note that there is an optimal
λ∗ for each Y . With three Y s and accordingly three λ∗s, one can easily calculate σ2x.
As a concrete illustration, consider the following numerical example: suppose the individual
has two selfs τ = 1, 2, and Prob(u1) = 0.5 and Prob(u2) = 0.5. There are two options,
Option x and Option y. Option x is a lottery, and EU1(x) = 1 and EU2(x) = 0. Option y is
a sure payment, and the individual's preference over y is complete, i.e., EU1(y) = EU2(y).
For the ease of illustration, assume further that EU1(y) = EU2(y) = y. The function φ (· )
takes the form of φ(EUτ ) = 1 − e−EUτ . The decision utility of choosing option x is then
V (x) = 0.5(1−e−1)+0.5×0 = 0.316, and the decision utility of choosing option y is V (y) =
1−e−y. It can be easily shown that when e1+e<y < 12 , the individual is better oﬀ by opting
for the lottery(λx; (1−λ)y) instead of choosing option x or option y. The decision utility of
such a lottery is: V (λx+(1−λ)y) = 0.5 [1− e−[λ×1+(1−λ)×y]]+0.5×[1− e−[λ×0+(1−λ)×y]].
Simple calculation shows that the optimal λ:
λ∗ =

0
−ln( y1−y )
1
y ≥ 12 ,
e
1+e<y <
1
2 ,
y ≤ e1+e .
Figure 1 provides the optimal λ for the value of y. As one can see, when Option y
becomes more attractive, the value of λ∗ decreases. Moreover, λ∗ approaches to 0.5 when
the two options become similar in terms of their decision utilities (V (y) = 0.314 versus
V (x) = 0.316).
Note that in the current setup, λ∗ is constructed as the ratio according to which the
individual is paid with Option x. As a ﬁrst interpretation of λ∗, note that the value of
λ∗ increases with the utility diﬀerence ∆τ of Option x over Option y. This feature of λ∗
is closely related to the error term in stochastic choice models, where the probability of
choosing the more attractive option is increasing with the utility diﬀerence of the more
attractive over the less attractive option. In this sense, the value of λ∗ can be interpreted
10
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Figure 1: The optimal λ∗ depending on the value of y. Figure is produced by assuming
φ(EUτ ) = 1 − e−EUτ , Prob(u1) = 0.5, Prob(u2) = 0.5, EU1(x) = 1,EU2(x) = 0, and
EU1(y) = EU2(y) = y.
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as the choice probability in stochastic choice models. When preferences are incomplete, the
choice probability is moderated by indecisiveness in preferences. An increase in σ2x, i.e.,
when the individual's preference over Option x versus Option y becomes less complete,
decreases its probability of being chosen. As a second interpretation, the mechanism
through which λ∗ is obtained and the interpretation of λ∗ have a striking similarity to
an old idea in psychology: the matching law in operant conditioning (Herrnstein, 1961;
McDowell, 2005). This states that the probability of an alternative being chosen is based
on the relative attractiveness of options. It is observed in both animals and human agents
and is considered as a clear violation of rational choices. However, Loewenstein et al. (2009)
show that the matching law can be made consistent with rational choices if we regard the
choices of a single subject as being made up of a sequence of multiple selves - one for
each instant of time. Although their result is obtained in an entirely diﬀerent context, the
fundamental idea is surprisingly similar. Last, due to indecisiveness in preferences, the
individual orders Option x better than Option y with some utility functions and shows the
reverse preference ordering with others, and she considers all utility functions relevant. By
choosing a randomization probability λ rather than either of the two options, she exhibits
a preference for convexity. Cerreia-Vioglio (2009) interprets the preference for convexity
as a preference for hedging and links it to uncertainty about future tastes.
3 An experiment
To test our model and check the performance of our measure of indecisiveness in pref-
erences, we ran an experiment in which subjects faced choice pairs of Option x versus
Option y. In each choice pair Option x was a payment of 20 euro in one month's time,
while Option y consisted of an immediate payment ranging from 11 euro to 20 euro with
an increment of 1 euro.
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Figure 2: The experimental implementation of the elicitation method for indecisiveness in
preferences. Subjects move the slider to decide their optimal λ∗.When subjects moved the
bar, the probabilities below changed to reﬂect the decision.
3.1 Stimuli
Speciﬁcally, the experiment consisted of two tasks: the randomization task and the con-
ﬁdence task. In the randomization task, subjects faced 10 decisions. In each decision
subjects faced the Option x and an Option y, with 11 ≤ y ≤ 20. The sequence of Option y
was randomized on each individual subject level. As explained in subsection 2.2 subjects,
instead of choosing either Option x or y, chose a randomization probability λ. Note that
both Option x and Option y are sure payments. This allows us to interpret the randomiza-
tion probability λ as the probability according to which subjects are paid with Option x.
For example, a value of λ = 0.75 means subjects choose to be paid accordingly to option
x with a probability of 0.75, while to be paid according to option y with a probability
of 0.25. The increment of this randomization probability was speciﬁed at 0.01. Figure
3.1 illustrates the decision screen. When subjects moved the bar, the probabilities below
changed to reﬂect the decision.
The conﬁdence task is similar to the standard pairwise choice task. Subjects faced a table
of ten choice pairs of Option x versus Option y, in which Option y increased from 11 euro
to 20 euro down the rows. In each choice pair subjects chose one option out of the two. In
addition subjects stated - without monetary incentive - how conﬁdent they felt about their
choice. They could state their conﬁdence in ﬁve steps: surely Option x, probably Option
x, unsure, probably Option y, and surely Option y. This idea is built on a literature closely
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related to incomplete preferences, the so-called imprecise preferences (see e.g., Butler and
Loomes, 2007). As indecisiveness is closely related to the conﬁdence in making decisions,
we believe this measure could provide valuable complementary information to our measure.
Our focus is on the randomization task, because decisions in this task allow the distinction
of our model from previous models. In the experiment, however, we started with the
conﬁdence task. We believe the conﬁdence task is simpler and easier to understand for
subjects. Subjects face the more complicated randomization task after having ﬁnished the
conﬁdence task.
3.2 Sample and procedure
Subjects
The experiment was conducted online with a random sample of subjects of the DISCON
lab in Radboud University. In total, 92 students participated in the experiment, with
roughly half being male and half being female.
Procedure
It was programmed with OTree (Chen et al., 2016).5 The whole experiment lasted on
average 15 minutes. Invitations were sent in batches via OSEE (Greiner, 2015). Subjects
ﬁrst saw the experimental instruction which explains the decision and the payment proce-
dure. They then completed the conﬁdence task and the randomization task as described
above. Finally, they ﬁlled in a questionnaire with their ﬁelds of study, gender, and email
addresses. In the questionnaire they also indicated their preferred way of receiving the
payment: either via a bank transfer (they then provided their bank account) or picking up
the money at our secretary.
Motivating subjects
5The experiment contained several other tasks which will be reported in separate papers.
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Each student received 2.5 euro participation fee. Additionally, 20% of students were chosen
for real payment. One of the two tasks was randomly chosen. If the conﬁdence task
was chosen for payment, one row would be randomly chosen and the subjects' preferred
choice determined their payment. If the randomization task was chosen for payment, one
decision was randomly chosen. Computer then determined the payment option according
to the randomization probability that subjects speciﬁed in the randomly chosen task. The
payment was 20 euro plus 2.50 euro among the chosen students. All subjects chose to be
paid via bank transfers. The payment was made either in one month (should Option x
was chosen for payment), or in the same day (should Option y was chosen for payment).
The participation fee of 2.50 euro was done in the same day should subjects chosen bank
transfers.
3.3 Experimental results
In the report of our experimental results we mainly focus on the randomization task. Before
presenting the experimental results, we oﬀer the predictions for the randomization task
under some popular theories of decision making under risk and uncertainty. Cerreia-Vioglio
et al.'s (2015) model is an important contribution in completing incomplete preferences and
we also derive a prediction under their model.
Proposition. Under EUT, some popular non-EU theories, such as (cumulative) prospect
theory, rank dependent utility theory (Quiggin, 1982), and Guls (1991) disappointment
aversion theory, as well as Cerreia-Vioglio et al.'s (2015) model: subjects randomize at
most once, and λ∗ ∈ (0, 1) occurs only when subjects are indiﬀerent between Option x and
Option y.
Proofs can be found in Appendix.
Our main experimental results are summarized below.
Result 1. Consistent with our model, a large majority of subjects randomized over Option
x and Option y for at least two values of Option y, and the randomization probability of
choosing Option x decreases with the value of Option y.
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The number of subjects who chose
randomization probabilities λ∗ ∈ (0, 1) for
0 time 1 time more than 1 time more than 2 times
18 subjects 6 subjects 68 subjects 53 subjects
Table 1: The distribution of subjects that chose randomization probabilities within 0 and
1 for zero time, for one time, for more than one time, and for more than two times.
Support: First, as we can see from Table 1 68 out of 92 subjects assigned a randomization
probability strictly within 0 and 1.0 to Option y more than once. Only 18 out of 92
students could be identiﬁed as individuals having complete preferences: they ﬁrst assigned
λ∗ = 1 when Option y was small, and then assigned λ∗ = 0 when Option y was suﬃciently
attractive (for 14 out of 18 students this occurred when Option y was 20 euro). Six subjects
chose a randomization probability within 0 and 1 exactly once. Those subjects could either
be indecisive or have a complete preference and be indiﬀerent when choosing 0 < λ < 1 .
Second, consistent with Equation 2 and Figure 1 among the 68 subjects who randomized
more than once, 54 subjects' λ∗ decreased with the value of Option y. The median ran-
domization probabilities λ∗ assigned to Option x were, respectively, 1.00 when Option y
was 15 euro or lower, 0.955 when Option y was 16 euro, 0.87 when Option y was 17 euro,
0.65 when Option y was 18 euro, 0.45 when Option y was 19 euro, 0.00 when Option y
was 20 euro. Taking together, such a preference for randomization is consistent with our
model but stands in sharp contrast with most models of complete preferences as well as
Cerreia-Vioglio et al.'s (2015) model.
We now discuss the connection between the binary choices in the conﬁdence task and the
randomization probabilities in the randomized task. Subjects chose between Option x and
Option y in the conﬁdence task, and they typically started with Option x and switched
to Option y when Option y became suﬃciently high. We thus ﬁnd for each subject the
switching row at which subjects still preferred Option x but switched to Option y in the
following row. We then check the randomization probabilities one row above the switching
row, at the switching row, and one row below the switching row.
Result 2. Indecisive subjects were more likely to choose Option y over which they have
complete preferences when they were forced to choose between two options than when they
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Figure 3: A boxplot of the randomization probabilities that subjects assign to Option x,
as a function of the value of Option y. The thick lines are medians, the upper and lower
bars are 1st and 3rd quantiles, respectively.
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were allowed to randomize.
Support: We ﬁnd that the median randomization probability is 0.255 for Option y at the
switching row. The median randomization probability is 0.70 for Option y one row above
the switching row, and 0.10 for Option y one row below the switching. There is thus a
sense of caution in the binary choices of choosing between Option x and Option y: subjects
chose the safer option - Option y with sure payment today - when they were in doubt.
When allowed to randomize, however, subjects assigned a larger randomization probability
for Option x than for Option y (a median probability of 0.745 versus 0.255).
The measures of conﬁdence statements in, e.g., Butler and Loomes (2007) provide valuable
insights beyond dichotomous choices. Below we link the conﬁdence statements to our
quantitative measure.
Result 3. There is an asymmetry of the conﬁdence statements and the randomization
probabilities between Option x and Option y; and given a conﬁdence statement signiﬁcant
heterogeneity in the randomization probability exists among subjects.
Support: We ﬁnd, ﬁrst, that choosing surely x approximately corresponds to assigning
Option x to a median randomization probability of 1.00; choosing probably x approxi-
mately corresponds to assigning Option x to a median randomization probability of 0.90;
choosing unsure roughly corresponds to assigning Option x to a median randomization
probability of 0.70; choosing probably y approximately corresponds to assigning Option x
to a median randomization probability of 0.56; choosing surely y corresponds to assigning
Option x to a median randomization probability of 0.35. The above result reveals a clear
asymmetry: given the same qualitative statements, i.e., surely or probably, subjects as-
signed a much higher randomization probability to Option x than to Option y. A possible
interpretation of the above asymmetry is that subjects made qualitative statements such as
surely or probably based on the Eτ [∆τ ], the expected utility diﬀerence between Option
x and Option y, while the optimal randomization probability λ∗ depended additionally on
indecisiveness of the preference over Option x , as revealed by Equation 2.
Second, conﬁdence statements are self-reports and they could mean diﬀerently for diﬀerent
18
Figure 4: A boxplot of the randomization probability of Option x, given each conﬁdence
statements. The thick line is median, the upper and lower bars are 2nd and 3rd quantiles,
respectively.
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people. As one can observe from Figure 4, there is signiﬁcant heterogeneity of randomiza-
tion probabilities across subjects in each conﬁdence statement, in particular for Probably
x, Unsure, Probably y , and Surely y .
4 Conclusion
We have developed a model of completing incomplete preferences. Incomplete preferences
are captured by individuals having not a single but a set of utility functions. Individuals
perform standard expected utility calculations, given any speciﬁc utility function, and have
an subjective expectation of the transformed standard expected utilities with respect to a
set of utility functions.
Based on this model, we propose an incentive-compatible mechanism to measure the degree
of indecisiveness in preferences. In the mechanism, individuals face a sure payment and an
alternative that we are interested in ﬁnding out indecisiveness. Instead of choosing either
the sure payment or the alternative, as in typical pairwise choice tasks, individuals are
allowed to allocate the probabilities according to which they are paid with the alternative
or the sure payment. When individuals' preferences are incomplete and their behavior is
in line with our model, we show that the value assigned to the alternative provides a proxy
for the degree of indecisiveness in preferences over the alternative. The obtained measure
can be interpreted as the choice probability in stochastic choice models and has a striking
similarity to the matching law in operant conditioning. An experiment provides results
consistent with our model but challenges alternative theories.
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The deciding individual
Self 1 Self 2 ... Self n
l l ... l
The deciding individual
ce1(l) ce2(l) ... cen(l)
Table 2: The left panel depicts the decision problem D(l) when the individual faces l
and has n selfs. The right panel depicts the decision problem D(cel), where ceτ (l) is the
certainty equivalent of l given uτ .
Appendix 1: A detailed development of Theorem 1:
Our representation can be seen a mirror of the smooth model of ambiguity when the states
are over the set of utility functions. Below we provide a more detailed development of
Theorem 1.
Assumption 1. Expected Utility Over Risky Lotteries Given a Self. Given a self, τ ,
there exists a unique utility function, uτ , continuous, strictly increasing, and normalized
so that uτ (w) = 0 and uτ (b) = 1 such that for all l1 and l2 ∈ L, l1 τ l2 if and only if∫
X uτ (x) dl1 ≥
∫
X uτ (x) dl2.
An individual's preference of self τ can then be captured by utility function uτ (· ), ∀τ ∈ Γ.
Dubra et al. (2004) suggest the following representation when an individual's preference
over L is potentially incomplete. There exists a set {uτ}τ∈Γ of real functions on L such
that, for all lotteries l1 and l2 ,
l1  l2 ⇐⇒
∫
C
uτ (c) dl1 ≥
∫
C
uτ (c) dl2 ∀τ ∈ Γ.
When the set {uτ}τ∈Γ is of a singleton, we are back to the standard expected utility
theory with complete preferences. Given the above setup, the individual essentially faces
the situation depicted in the left panel of Table 2. Let D(l) denote the decision problem
when the individual faces l.
We require that ∀p ∈ 4C, ∃a ∈ [w, b] such that p ∼τ δa, where 4C is the set of Borel
probability measures over C and δa is the degenerated lottery obtaining a with probability
one. This condition makes sure the existence of ceτ (l) ∈ [w, b], deﬁned as the certainty
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equivalent of risky lottery l given uτ . The existence of ceτ (l) allows us to transform the
decision problem D(l) into the decision problem D(cel) that is depicted in the right panel
of Table 2.
The diﬃculty remains: how does an individual aggregate across selfs? Aggregation of
similar forms has been discussed extensively in the social welfare literature (see e.g., Hicks,
1939). It is generally agreed that aggregating across diﬀerent individuals is extremely
diﬃcult or even meaningless. Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2015) do not attempt to aggregate
across selfs. Instead, by invoking the negative certainty independence axiom, they obtain a
representation similar to the Rawlsian scheme: the alternative is evaluated by the self who
gives the lowest certainty equivalent. We believe more can be done. Recall in Assumption 1
that the utility function, uτ , is normalized such that uτ (w) = 0 and uτ (b) = 1. Thus, utility
functions, although diﬀerent across selfs, are based on the same metric. Comparison among
selfs is thus not comparing apples and oranges. After all, the aggregation across selfs is
performed for the same individual. We believe, the idea that for the same individual there
exists a common scale of utility across selfs is a plausible one. For example, Binmore (1998,
chapter 4, p.259) concludes that intra-personal comparisons of oneself in diﬀerent roles in
a society are completely acceptable. This observation motivates the next assumption. But
before stating it, a new object needs to be deﬁned.
Deﬁnition 1. An act, f ∈ F , is a function f : Γ → [w, b] that aggregates selfs to a
monetary outcome.
The act f is deﬁned over the set of selfs, thus it is diﬀerent from the act deﬁned in, e.g.,
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989); Klibanoﬀ et al. (2005). Yet, it is consistent with the Savage
act where the states of the world is the set of selfs. For this reason we still call f an act.
Note that f(τ) ∈ [w, b] is a monetary outcome given a self τ . Let f denote the individual's
preference over the acts, and let Π denote the set of Borel probability measures over Γ.
We can now state the second assumption.
Assumption 2. Aggregation in the Form of Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) over Acts.
There exists a countably additive probability measure pi ∈ Π and a continuous and strictly
increasing function v : [w, b]→ R such that for all f1, f2 ∈ F ,
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f1 f f2 ⇐⇒
∫
Γ
v[f1(τ)]dpi ≥
∫
Γ
v[f2(τ)]dpi.
The subjective probability distribution pi captures the individual's subjective assessment
of the relevance of the selfs in evaluating l. Given a self, τ , by Assumption 1, lottery
l is evaluated with the utility function uτ according to the expected utility theory. An
individual should then be indiﬀerent between facing lottery l as in D(l) or facing f that
produces ceτ (l) for each self τ as inD(cel). This property motivates the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 2. Given l ∈ L, f l ∈ F denotes an act reduced from l. The reduced act of l,
f l, is deﬁned as
f l(τ) = ceτ (l) for ∀τ∈Γ .
The ﬁnal assumption relates the preference ordering of lotteries l ∈ L to the preference
ordering of their reduced acts f l ∈ F :
Assumption 3. Consistency with Preferences over Reduced Acts. Given l1, l2 ∈ L and
their reduced acts, f l1, f
l
2 ∈ F,
l1  l2 ⇐⇒ f l1 f f l2.
Assumption 3 essentially states that the individual regards D(cel) and D(l) equivalent.
Assumption 3 suggests how preferences over acts f are related to preferences over lotteries
. Based on assumption 1, 2, and 3, it can then be shown that
Theorem. Given Assumption 1, 2, and 3, there exists a countably additive probability
measure pi ∈ Π and a continuous and strictly increasing φ : R → R subjecting to positive
aﬃne transformation such that  is represented by the preference functional V : L → R
given by
V (l) =
∫
Γ
φ [EUτ (l)] dpi. (3)
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The proof follows largely Klibanoﬀ et al. (2005) and is omitted here.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of prediction under some popular non-EU theories: The simple lottery
(λx, (1 − λ)y) is a binary prospect. In the evaluation of binary prospects, (cumulative)
prospect theory, rank dependent utility theory (Quiggin, 1982), and Guls (1991) dis-
appointment aversion theory gives qualitatively the same evaluation (Observation 7.11.1
in Wakker, 2010, p. 231). Below we illustrate the proof under (cumulative) prospect
theory. With a slight abuse of notations, let v(·) denote the value function, V (·) denote
the prospect value of a lottery, w(·) denote the probability weighting function. Suppose
x CPT y, where CPT denotes strict preference relation implied by CPT. Under CPT
we haveV (x) > V (y). Consider now λx+ (1− λ)y. By CPT we have V [λx+ (1− λ)y] =
w(λ)v(x) + [1 − w(λ)]v(y) = v(y) + w(λ)[v(x) − v(y)]. Since w(λ) increases with λ, we
have λ = 1 when x CPT y. The other case y CPT x can be shown similarly.
Proof of prediction under Cerreia-Vioglio et al.'s (2015) model: Let y denote a
degenerated lottery with a sure payment. It can be shown that (1) y ≺ x =⇒ λx+(1−λ)y ≺
x; (2) y  x =⇒ y  λx + (1 − λ)y. This again implies that λ ∈ (0, 1) occurs only when
subjects are indiﬀerent between Option y and Option x. This result is due to the special
role of sure payment in Cerreia-Vioglio et al.'s (2015) model. The ﬁrst result is simply
an implication of the negative certainty independence axiom. To obtain the second result,
observe that if y  x, then V (y) > V (x) by the representation theorem of Cerreia-Vioglio
et al. (2015). In particular, there exists τ ∈ Γ such that y = V (y) > ce(x, τ), where ce(x, τ)
denotes the certainty equivalence of Option x with respect to the utility function uτ . It is
then immediate to see that for any λ ∈ (0, 1) we have y = ce(y, τ) > ce(λx+ (1− λ)y, τ).
This implies that for any λ ∈ (0, 1) V (y) = y = ce(y, τ) > ce(λx + (1 − λ)y, τ) ≥
infτ∈Γ ce(λx+ (1− λ)y, τ) = V (λx+ (1− λ)y, τ).6
6The proof of the second result is gratefully provided by Simone Cerreia-Vioglio via a private corre-
spondence.
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